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Thursday 26 October 2017

Ad interim injunction - Defendant made a statement that he will not demolish the wall - I

*IMPORTANT DECISIONS (14.10.2017)*

*Ad interim injunction - Defendant made a statement that he will not demolish the wall - In view of statement case adjourned for filing written statement and reply to stay application - Written statement filed - Two days thereafter wall demolished - View taken by Courts below that statement of defendant that he shall not demolish wall was valid till filing of written statement which is a possible view - No illegality in the view taken by Courts below.  (2010(1) Civil Court Cases 269 (P&H)*

*Civil & Criminal liability - Merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. (2010(1) Criminal Court Cases 779 (S.C.)*

*Contempt of Courts - Default alleged though is unmistakably evident, but in the absence of any wilful or deliberate intention to commit the same, a person is not liable for contempt. (2017(3) Apex Court Judgments 080 (S.C.)*

*Criminal breach of trust & cheating - Non-payment of bill amount pertaining to contract between parties - Offence u/ss 406 & 420 IPC not made out. (2015(1) Criminal Court Cases 002 (S.C.)*

*Death of complainant - Held, death of complainant cannot ipso-facto bring about termination of criminal proceeding. (2014(1) Criminal Court Cases 573 (Allahabad)*

*Dishonour of cheque - Accused residing outside jurisdiction of Court - Inquiry/investigation u/s 202 Cr.P.C. - Held, provision of S.202 Cr.P.C. is not applicable to proceedings u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. (2014(3) Civil Court Cases 475 (P&H)*

*Dying declaration -  Even a statement given u/s 161 Cr.P.C. to a police officer may be regarded as a dying declaration. (2017(3) Criminal Court Cases 860 (Calcutta)*

*Offence u/ss 307, 452, 324, 323, 427 & 34 IPC - Compromise - Chances of conviction are remote and bleak  - FIR quashed. (2017(3) Criminal Court Cases 851 (P&H)*

*Tenancy agreement between employer and employee - Employee is under contractual obligation to vacate the quarter on his retirement. (2017(3) Apex Court Judgments 114 (S.C.)*

*Written statement -  Failure to make specific denial amounts to an admission. (2017(3) Apex Court Judgments 001 (S.C.)*

Loudspeakers-Religious-places-Vs-Right to privacy-Delhi-HC-issues-Notice to Centre-read-petition/

Loudspeakers-Religious-places-Vs-Right to privacy-Delhi-HC-issues-Notice to Centre-read-petition/ The Delhi High Court has issued notice to the Union of India on a public interest litigation for removal of loudspeakers from all religious structures on the ground that their use is an encroachment on a person’s “right to be left alone and spatial control” and thus violates the newly recognised fundamental right to privacy.

A bench headed by Acting Chief Justice Gita Mittal issued the notice on the PIL filed by social activist Sanjjiiv Kkumaar.

Loudspeakers not intrinsic to any religion

Sanjjiiv, in his PIL, traced the advent of all religions in India to say, “Hinduism is 4,000 years old, Jainism is 2,600 years old, Buddhism is 2,500 years old, Christianity is 2,000 years old, Islam is 1,400 years old, Sikhism is 500 years old and on another hand, Moving coil current loudspeakers are not even 100 years old. Thus, it’s beyond doubt, and as facts and truth speaks for itself per se, loudspeakers were never a part of any religion”.

“As loudspeakers is not part of/intrinsic to any of the religions as all religions are 4,000 to 500 years old whereas loudspeaker came into existence in 1924, that is less than 100 years and hence, banning them will not violate Article 25 or 26 of the Constitution of India,” he said.

The petition also quoted from the Supreme Court’s verdict in Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution as: “No religion ever says to force the unwilling to listen to expressions of religious beliefs.”

“This observation of Hon’ble Apex Court is of utmost importance as what Supreme Court says, Loudspeakers do exactly opposite of the same and hence violate fundamental rights of citizens of India,” the PIL said.

Man’s house is his castle, loudspeakers breach right to be left alone.

The petitioner relied heavily on the privacy judgment of the Supreme Court to say that its use is breach of privacy.

“Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his “castle”; it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty,” it said.

It quoted an observation made by Justice DY Chandrachud in the privacy judgment that “one’s house is like a castle to him. If loudspeakers are encroaching one’s right of spatial control (one’s home), one’s right to left alone, then what’s the meaning of fundamental rights? It will be just on paper. Hence to protect and uphold the fundamental rights of one’s “left alone”, “personhood (physical and mental peace), spatial control - Loudspeakers need to go”.

The petitioner said that use of loudspeakers certainly takes away the right of the citizens to speak with others, their right to read or think or the right to sleep.

“There may be heart patients or patients suffering from nervous disorder may be compelled to bear this serious impact of sound pollution which has had an adverse effect on them. Toddlers, kids are equally affected,” he added.Good Morning 💐Reg.RCK R.Chandra Kumar Advocate & Candt.for Treasurer.

Important judgments (20/10/2017)

Important judgments (20/10/2017)

Senior Citizens Act – Scheme of the Act does not contemplate for resolving property disputes between or among members of a family - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (DB)

Campus politics – Political activities like dharna, hunger strikes and other practices like sathyagrah have no place in academic institutions - 2017 (5) KHC 13 (DB)

Co-operative Society – S.4(5) of Payment of Gratuity Act which enables an employee to opt for a better terms of gratuity will prevail over Second Proviso to Rule 59(iii) of Co-operative Societies Rules - 2017 (5) KHC 15 (FB)

Family Courts — If one of the parties desires that the proceedings should be held in camera, Family Court has no option but to so direct - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC) 

Rule 5 of Advocates’ Welfare Fund Rules is in conflict with Section 15 of Advocates’ Welfare Fund Act – Court reads down Rule 5 - 2017 (5) KHC 89

Family Courts Act — Once settlement fails and if both the parties give consent that a witness can be examined in video conferencing, that can be allowed - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC)

Answers given in answer to the leading questions put in the examination-in-chief are liable to be discarded - 2017 (5) KHC 75

There can be acquisition of part of building or house - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (SC) (SN)

Constitution of India – Custodial deaths - Supreme Court issues directions in the matter - 2017 (5) KHC 2 (SC) (SN)

IPC S.34 — Principle of vicarious liability enshrined by S.34 extends only to the extent of common intention shared by parties - 2017 (5) KHC 83 (DB)

Senior Citizens Act – A person’s obligation to maintain a senior citizen has nothing to do with prospect of his possessing senior citizen’s property or his succeeding to senior citizen’s estate - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (DB)

Campus politics – In academic institutions, politics or political activities cannot be permitted - 2017 (5) KHC 13 (DB)

Challenge in fixation of fair value of land – Can be raised in appeal before District Collector under Section 45A of Stamp Act - 2017 (5) KHC 24

Canara Bank — Service terminated with punishment of compulsory retirement in the year 1986 – Those retired prior to 29/09/1995 up to 01/01/1986 formed a single homogeneous group and Bank is not justified in extending the benefit of pension retrospectively from 29/09/1995 to 01/01/1986 - 2017 (5) KHC 26 (DB)

Evidence Act, 1872 S.32(1) – Mere suspicion or apprehension in the mind of maker shall not be placed under S.32(1)  - 2017 (5) KHC 35 (DB)

CrPC S.164 — Statement recorded by Magistrate under S.164 can be used only either for corroboration or for contradiction and cannot be accepted as a substantive piece of evidence - 2017 (5) KHC 35 (DB)

Family Courts — In a transfer petition, no direction can be issued for video conferencing - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC) 

NI Act S.138 – Mere admission of accused that he issued a signed blank cheque cannot mean that he has admitted to execution of cheque - 2017 (5) KHC 75

Any other Authority other than State Co-operative Election Commission holding election when S.28B of Co-operative Societies Act is in force is null and void - 2017 (5) KHC 79 (DB)

SC: Non- production of the original — Not material if it getting lost sufficiently explained

_*⭐SC: Non- production of the original — Not material if it getting lost sufficiently explained — Not lodging of police complaint of the loss not crucial — Reliance on certified copy permissible under Succession Act, 1925 — S.63— Evidence Act, 1872, Ss. 65(c) and 63 (1) (para15).*_

_Case:_
_*Leela Rajagopal Vs Kamala Menon Cocharan.*_

_Citation:_
_*(2014) 15 SCC 570: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 267.*_

_Bench Strength *-2*_
_Coram: *Ranjan Gogoi and, R.K. Agrawal JJ.*_
***************************
_*Shared by:*_
_*ADV. MAHESH VASWANI,*_
_*MUMBAI.*_
_*Mobile: 9821610888*_
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LEGAL GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING VALIDITY OF WILL

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING VALIDITY OF WILL

Undue Influence means exercise of excessive persistence, dominance of physical power mind, and  will, or any burden applied due to authority or position, or relationship in relation to the power of the person submitting to it. It must be shown that will was the consequence of the implementation of the power and it is not sufficient to show that a person was in a situation or had the power to overcome the testator.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Testamentary Suit No. 74 of 2011 in Testamentary Petition No. 970 of 2009

Decided On: 14.10.2016
Panna Surendra Mehta
Vs.
Purnima Latik Shah
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.S. Patel, J.
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 278
A. PARTIES AND THE LITIGATION HISTORY

1. Jaswantbhai Natwarlal Jolia ("Jaswantbhai") died on 26th January 2004.1 He left a Will dated 10th August 2002.2 The Plaintiff, Panna S. Mehta ("Pannaben"), seeks Letters of Administration with Will Annexed to this Will. She is Jaswantbhai's sister-in-law, his wife Veenaben's sister. Panna is one of the beneficiaries of the Will. The major beneficiary is Panna's son, Ashitkumar Surendra Mehta, also known as Asit Mehta ("Asit"). He was also the sole executor named in the Will. Asit died on 18th May 2009.
2. Jaswantbhai's wife, Veena, died on 3rd March 2000, about four years before Jaswantbhai passed. Jaswantbhai and Veena had no children of their own. Jaswantbhai had three sisters, Ramaben Krishnalal Shah, Indiraben V Bankley and Trilochanaben T. Fozdar, and a brother Kanhaiyalal Dalal. Ramaben and Indiraben died before Jaswantbhai. He was, therefore, survived by Trilochanaben and Kanhaiyalal, his surviving siblings.

3. After Jaswantbhai died, Asit sought probate. He filed Testamentary Petition No. 243 of 2004. That petition was opposed by Trilochanaben and by three of Ramaben's children (Panna, Jitendra and Kishore). It was renumbered as Testamentary Suit No. 22 of 2004. Kanhaiyalal died on 10th May 2007 without leaving any heirs. Asit filed Notice of Motion No. 104 of 2007 to dismiss the caveats filed by Ramaben's children, contending that they had no caveatable interest, since, at the time when succession opened, Jaswantbhai's heirs in law were Trilochanaben and Kanhaiyalal, and they took before, in preference to, and to the exclusion of Ramaben's children. The Notice of Motion succeeded, and Ramaben's children's caveats were dismissed.

4. Asit died on 15th May 2009 and it was then held that his probate petition abated.4 On 30th September 2009, his mother, Pannaben, filed the present petition for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed seeking to prove Jaswantbhai's Will. On 25th November 2009, Trilochanaben filed Testamentary Petition No. 45 of 2010 for Letters of Administration to Jaswantbhai's estate. Pannaben filed a Caveat, and this was renumbered as Testamentary Suit No. 118 of 2010. On 1st November 2010, Trilochanaben died in Mumbai. She left a Will dated 11th February 2008. In this, she purported to make bequests of her share, if any, from Jaswantbhai's estate inter alia to her own children and to the children of her deceased sister, Ramaben.

5. On 1st April 2011, Trilochanaben's daughter, Purnima Latik Shah ("Purnima") filed a Caveat in the present Petition for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed brought by Pannaben. On 16th January 2013, Jitendra Krishnalal Shah and Jaisukh Krishnalal Shah, two of Ramaben's children, filed Caveats in the present Petition. Pannaben filed Notice of Motion No. 49 of 2013 for discharge of those Caveats. The Motion succeeded: the two Caveats by Jitendra and Jaisukh were discharged.5 Thus, Ramaben's children had twice opposed proof of Jaswantbhai's Will: first in the Probate Petition filed by Asit and again in the Petition for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed filed by Pannaben. Both oppositions failed. The surviving opposition to the present Petition is only, therefore, by Purnima.

B. THE WILL DATED 10TH AUGUST 2002

6. I turn now to the physical aspect of the Will dated 10th August 2002. This is a two-page document typed in English. Jaswantbhai's signatures appear on both pages. The attesting witnesses to this Will are Mr. Kirit Damania, an Advocate & Solicitor of this Court, and one Ms. Shree Kumary S. Mr. Damania was Jaswantbhai's friend and legal advisor. Ms. Shree Kumary S was his stenographer. In the document, the testator refers to himself as "Jaswantbhai"; he signs it as "Jaswantlal". This, as we shall see, is of significance because it is central to Purnima's opposition that he was never known by this name but only as "Jaswantlal". In the Will, Jaswantbhai sets out his properties and assets in some detail. He makes an absolute bequest in favour of his nephew, Ashitkumar (alias Asitkumar, alias Asit), and directs him to take charge of his entire estate. He also devises and bequeaths all his gold and other valuable ornaments and silver utensils in equal shares to 1) Devyani H. Kapadia (Pannaben's sister) and 2) Pannaben. The Will also speaks of a flat at Kirti Manor on S.V. Road, Santacruz (W). The words "with two garages" are handwritten. Then there is the signature of the testator on the first page.

C. THE CAVEAT & AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

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7. In her Affidavit in Support of her Caveat, Purnima alleges that this Will is forged, fabricated and unnatural.6 She takes these grounds:

"(a) Purnima says that the name on the Will is 'Jaswantbhai Natwarlal Jolia' and not 'Jaswantlal Natwarlal Jolia', which was his 'real' name. She claims he was never known as Jaswantlbhai. The Defendant also relies on the death certificate,7 bank account details8 and certain share certificates9 to substantiate her claim.
(b) Purnima claims that Jaswantlal's signature was obtained on a blank paper; the Will had been drawn thereafter and that the signature itself is of Jaswantlal Jolia and not Jaswantbhai Jolia.
(c) Purnima alleges that Asit coerced Jaswantlal into signing the Will;
(d) Finally, Purnima sets up an affirmative case that Jaswantlal always treated Purnima as his own daughter and, therefore, he would have confided in her and brought to her notice his intention to create a Will.

8. Mrs. R.P. Sondurbaldota J framed and settled issues on 1st March 2012.10 On 1st September 2016, I framed an additional issue, parties having agreed. The final issues are set out below with my findings against each.

13. The burden of these two issues is on the Plaintiff. They need to be addressed together. The requirements of a valid unprivileged Will are well known. The testator must be an adult of sound mind.26 He must be shown to have made the Will of his own volition and without any importunity as might rob him of free agency.27 He must sign the Will intending it to be such a document. The execution of the Will must be attested by at least two witnesses. Both need not be present at the same time, but each must have seen the testator sign the Will.28

15. Mr. Damania was cross-examined, though very briefly.30 The very first question put to him was whether this was the first time Mr. Damania had said that Jaswantbhai and Jaswantlal were the same person. The question is itself peculiar;To this, Mr. Damania responded saying that for at least a year prior to his death, the testator could move about and had a good memory.32 Again, this was an answer that ought to have been tested further in cross-examination but was not. It remains uncontroverted.

17. The time frame of these questions is unhelpful. The Will is of 10th August 2002. Jaswantbhai lived for a good two years after, and died on 26th January 2004. The first of the questions about his health relates to a period of four years before 10th August 2002, i.e., about 1998; and that is, therefore, irrelevant. The second is vague when it speaks of 'last days', and in any case is fully met by Mr. Damania's answer, that at least for a year before his demise.

19. To demonstrate testamentary incapacity, Purnima had to show either that Jaswantlal was, on account of his condition of paralytic attacks, never, i.e., at no point in time, in a sufficiently lucid state of mind to make a testamentary instrument, or, alternatively, that on the day in question, 10th August 2002, he was so incapacitated that he could not possibly have made the Will.

20. Though Purnima called very many medical practitioners to give evidence, none of it establishes testamentary incapacity. The only relevant testimony is from DW4, Dr. P. Marfatia.

22. The other doctors contribute nothing to this, and I do not propose to spend further time labouring their evidence. DW2, Dr. Borse, spoke of Jaswantbhai's hospitalization in 1998. That is not denied.

23. There is nothing, I note, to controvert Mr. Damania's evidence of the actual execution and attestation of the Will. As to the second aspect, viz., testamentary capacity, there is no material to indicate that Jaswantbhai lacked it in the slightest on the day he made the Will. The inevitable result is that Issues Nos. 1 and 2 are proved.

26. Now, apart from the Pannaben's unequivocal refutation of the suggestion, what is important is the suggestion implicit in the question. If it is, therefore, shown that Jaswantlal and Jaswantbhai are the same person, then on this case placed by the Defendant herself the Testamentary Suit must succeed; for it admits the execution of the Will but only disputes the identity of the maker of it.

27. Later, Pannaben said that Jaswantlal N. Jolia was the family name or he was so known to the family, but in business circles he was known as Jaswantbhai. This is of some significance, because among Gujaratis, the word 'bhai' is an honorific and a frequently used term of respect. Yet again, there is no follow through on this answer and it remains untested.

28. What follows, however, is as baffling as it is crucial. The Plaintiff was confronted with an undated letter from the testator to the Branch Manager of the Bombay Mercantile Cooperative Bank. This was marked in evidence.

30. Quite apart from these two answers being utterly fatal to the Defendant's case on the question of a difference in identity, it must be noted that in the two printed documents, the letterhead shows the testator's name (and there is no doubt that it was the deceased who signed both) as "Jashwantbhai"; i.e., there is yet another variant in the name, one that is clearly as irrelevant as the difference between Jaswantlal and Jaswantbhai.

31. I turn next to the evidence of DW8, Mr. Chandanmal B. Chhajed, a Chartered Accountant with M/s. C.B. Chhajed & Co. He filed an Affidavit in lieu of Examination-in-Chief,45 and was briefly further examined in chief.46 He claimed to have a photocopy of Ex. D-1, the letter dated 12th March 2001 to him by the deceased. He referred to this letter in his examination-in-chief.

32. This is the last nail in the defence's coffin. The Defendant's own witness deposes that her case, of the two being different, and of the testator never being known as, or using, the name "Jaswantbhai" is untrue. There are other documents that the Defendant put into evidence, too, such as the share certificate at Ex. "D-4",47 admitted by the Defendant to be signed by the deceased and showing his name, written in Gujarati, as 'Jaswantbhai'.

33. The evidence of DW6, DW7 and DW9 carries the matter no further. None knew Jaswantbhai personally, but only in their professional capacity as bank managers at their respective banks. Their testimonies before the Commissioner do not assist the Defendant's case in any way.


34. There is absolutely no substance to the case that the testator was never known as Jaswantbhai but only ever as Jaswantlal. The evidence the Defendant herself led destroys her case as pleaded that the Will was fabricated.

35. On the question of forgery, there is no evidence whatever and, again, the Defendant's own pleadings, admissions in the cross-examination in questions, and on documents falsifies any such case.

36. As to the case on 'undue influence',48 there is no evidence at all. To invalidate a Will, undue influence must be established as a fact. The actual exercise of that undue influence on the testator, and which is in the nature of coercion and fraud, must also be demonstrated.49 It is not enough to show that one person was in a position or had the power to overbear the testator; it must be shown that Will was the result of the exercise of that power.50 Generalized allegations will not do: undue influence is to pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision.51

The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well-founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict - positive or negative."

43. The mere fact that some heirs are excluded is not per se evidence of a Will being unnatural; every Will disrupts the ordinary line of succession, and this is obvious.55 Were it otherwise, there would be no need for Wills. As against Purnima's lack of evidence, there is the evidence of Pannaben, elicited in her cross-examination, that her son, Asit, stayed with Jaswantbhai.56 She said she had some proof of this, but not complete proof. This is in sharp contrast to Purnima's case, of which she has no proof at all.

44. Issue No. 3A must, therefore, be answered in the negative.

I. CONCLUSION & ORDER

45. The testamentary jurisdiction is one of caution, not suspicion.57 Where nothing is shown against the reasonable nature of a Will, and there are no suspicious circumstances, the propounder's onus is discharged. On an overall assessment, it seems to me clear from the record that Jaswantbhai, himself childless, was close to Pannaben and her son, and treated her son (Asit) as his own. Issues such as undue influence, coercion, forgery or the Will being unnatural cast the burden not on the propounder, but on he or she who alleges these things.58

46. The suit succeeds, and is decreed with costs. The caveat is dismissed. The Registry will proceed to issue Letters of Administration with Will Annexed in respect of the Will dated 10th August 2002 of Jaswantbhai alias Jaswantlal Natwarlal Jolia.

47. The drawn up decree or order is dispensed with. The Registry is not to raise any objections or requisitions regarding service of citations. Given that the Petition is of 2009, pending for seven years already (and that a probate was first sought even earlier in 2004, i.e., 12 years ago), Letters of Administration with Will Annexed are to be issued no later than by 30th November 2016. For these reasons, and since, too, I have found not a shred of substance in the defence, the application for stay of this order is refused.

48. The registry will act on an authenticated copy of this order.

4Order dated 4th September 2009, following the decision of the Division Bench in Thrity Sam Shroff v Shiraz Byramji Anklesaria, 2007 (4) Mh. L.J. 56. The correctness of this decision has been doubted in the Division Bench decision in Haresh Chetan Thadani v Komal Suresh Chainani, Appeal No. 1 of 2015, decided on 27th January 2015, in appeal from an order I passed on 16th December 2014 allowing a Chamber Summons for conversion of a probate Petition into one for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed. The Division Bench in Thadani held that in Thrity Sam Shroff, the Court's attention had not been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shambu Prasad Agarwal & Ors. v Bhola Ram Agarwal, (2000) 9 SCC 714. 28Succession Act, Section 63. The Section allows the making of a mark or the signature on behalf of the testator by another and at his direction; each attesting witness must either see the testator sign, make or make another sign the Will or receive a personal acknowledgement of the signature, mark or other person's signature from the testator.

Wednesday 25 October 2017

Important judgments (20/10/2017)

Important judgments (20/10/2017)

Senior Citizens Act – Scheme of the Act does not contemplate for resolving property disputes between or among members of a family - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (DB)

Campus politics – Political activities like dharna, hunger strikes and other practices like sathyagrah have no place in academic institutions - 2017 (5) KHC 13 (DB)

Co-operative Society – S.4(5) of Payment of Gratuity Act which enables an employee to opt for a better terms of gratuity will prevail over Second Proviso to Rule 59(iii) of Co-operative Societies Rules - 2017 (5) KHC 15 (FB)

Family Courts — If one of the parties desires that the proceedings should be held in camera, Family Court has no option but to so direct - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC) 

Rule 5 of Advocates’ Welfare Fund Rules is in conflict with Section 15 of Advocates’ Welfare Fund Act – Court reads down Rule 5 - 2017 (5) KHC 89

Family Courts Act — Once settlement fails and if both the parties give consent that a witness can be examined in video conferencing, that can be allowed - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC)

Answers given in answer to the leading questions put in the examination-in-chief are liable to be discarded - 2017 (5) KHC 75

There can be acquisition of part of building or house - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (SC) (SN)

Constitution of India – Custodial deaths - Supreme Court issues directions in the matter - 2017 (5) KHC 2 (SC) (SN)

IPC S.34 — Principle of vicarious liability enshrined by S.34 extends only to the extent of common intention shared by parties - 2017 (5) KHC 83 (DB)

Senior Citizens Act – A person’s obligation to maintain a senior citizen has nothing to do with prospect of his possessing senior citizen’s property or his succeeding to senior citizen’s estate - 2017 (5) KHC 1 (DB)

Campus politics – In academic institutions, politics or political activities cannot be permitted - 2017 (5) KHC 13 (DB)

Challenge in fixation of fair value of land – Can be raised in appeal before District Collector under Section 45A of Stamp Act - 2017 (5) KHC 24

Canara Bank — Service terminated with punishment of compulsory retirement in the year 1986 – Those retired prior to 29/09/1995 up to 01/01/1986 formed a single homogeneous group and Bank is not justified in extending the benefit of pension retrospectively from 29/09/1995 to 01/01/1986 - 2017 (5) KHC 26 (DB)

Evidence Act, 1872 S.32(1) – Mere suspicion or apprehension in the mind of maker shall not be placed under S.32(1)  - 2017 (5) KHC 35 (DB)

CrPC S.164 — Statement recorded by Magistrate under S.164 can be used only either for corroboration or for contradiction and cannot be accepted as a substantive piece of evidence - 2017 (5) KHC 35 (DB)

Family Courts — In a transfer petition, no direction can be issued for video conferencing - 2017 (5) KHC 48 (SC) 

NI Act S.138 – Mere admission of accused that he issued a signed blank cheque cannot mean that he has admitted to execution of cheque - 2017 (5) KHC 75

Any other Authority other than State Co-operative Election Commission holding election when S.28B of Co-operative Societies Act is in force is null and void - 2017 (5) KHC 79 (DB)

Tuesday 10 October 2017

How to prove breach of injunction order?

How to prove breach of injunction order?

A proceeding under Order XXXIX. Rule 2A, C.P.C., initiated on the ground of disobedience or breach of injunction order, is in the nature of a criminal proceeding as the person against whom such proceeding is initiated is liable to be detained in prison if it is found that he had committed breach of injunction order. Since a punishment is imposed and a person is sent to Jail, the principle on which these proceedings are decided are entirely different. Here the principle of criminal law will apply and the plaintiff will have to establish beyond any shadow of doubt that the defendants had committed disobedience or breach of the injunction order even though he had full knowledge of the same. The burden of proving its case in such cases lies entirely on the plaintiff. The principle on which a civil suit is decided are different as here decision on the issues arising out of pleadings is taken on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Therefore, a common judgment and order deciding the main suit as well as application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P.C. will not be proper. In my opinion, the order passed by learned Munsif on 11.12.1989 holding the defendants guilty in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and directing them to be detained in civil prison is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
Citation : AIR 1998 All 228

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
C.M.W.P. No. 682 of 1990
Decided On: 06.02.1998
Gyan Chand Jain and others
Vs.
XIIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Agra and others
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.P. Mathur, J.

1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the order dated 11.12.1989 of Munsif, Firozabad in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1988 and also the appellate order dated 22.1.1990 of XIIIth Additional District Judge. Agra in Misc. Appeal No. 253 of 1989. With the consent of the parties, the writ petition is disposed of finally at the admission stage.
2. Ram Babu Jain (original respondent No. 3 in the writ petition) filed O.S. No. 227 of 1985 against the petitioners Gyan Chand Jain, Umesh Chand Jain and Padam Chand Jain for injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in their possession in any manner over the ground floor of house No. 35 or causing any damage or throwing any dirty article therein. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the petitioners (defendants) were the owner-landlords of house No. 35 and he was a tenant thereof in the ground floor. The plaintiff had been paying rent to the defendants regularly but they wanted to evict him forcibly and in an unlawful manner and with that end in view, they were causing damage to the property and throwing dirty articles in the tenanted portion. The plaintiff moved an injunction application 7C on which the learned Munsif passed ex parte injunction order on 4.11.1985 directing the defendants to maintain status quo on the spot, not to demolish any portion of the property and not to interfere in the plaintiffs possession except in accordance with law. While passing this order, the learned Munsif fixed 3.12.1985 for appearance of the defendants and the injunction order was directed to be operative till that date. It appears that this injunction order was extended on 3.12.1985. The plaintiff moved an application sometime in the year 1987 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. alleging that the defendants had demolished a portion of the roof and the drainage pipe and thereby committed breach of the injunction order. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987. The plaintiff moved two other similar applications under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P.C. alleging that the defendants had committed breach of the Injunction order and they were registered as Misc. Case No. 68 of 1987 and Misc. Case No. 6 of 1989. After recording the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Munsif decreed the suit and passed a decree for injunction against the defendants. He also held the defendants guilty under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and directed that each of the defendants be detained in civil prison for a period of one month. Similarly in Misc. Case No. 68 of 1987, each of the defendants were ordered to be detained in civil prison for a period of two months and in Misc. Case No. 6 of 1989 each of the defendants were directed to be detained for a period of three months. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 11.12.19891 of the learned Munsif, the defendants filed a regular First Appeal under Section 96, C.P.C. and three Misc. Appeals under Order XLII1. Rule 1 (r), C.P.C. The Misc. Appeal against the order of learned Munsif passed in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 which was registered as Misc. Civil Appeal No. 253 of 1989 was dismissed on 22.1.1990 which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition. The other two Misc. Appeals which were preferred against the order of learned Munsif passed in Misc. Case No. 68 of 1987 and Misc. Case No. 6 of 1989 were allowed and the order directing the defendants to be detained in civil prison for a period of two months and three months respectively was set aside.
3. 1 have heard Sri G. R, Jain for the petitioners, Sri S. Harkauli for the contesting-respondents and have examined the record.
4. Sri Jain, learned counsel, for the petitioners has submitted that the procedure adopted by the learned Munsif in deciding the suit as well as the Misc. cases under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. by one composite order is illegal and therefore, the order directing the defendants to be detained in the civil prison is liable to be set aside. The judgment of the learned Munsif dated 11.12.1989 shows that he decided the main Suit being O.S. No. 227 of 1985 as well as three Misc. cases namely 67/87. 68/87 and 6 of 1989 by one composite order. The controversies raised in the Suit and that in the Misc. cases registered on the basis of the applications moved by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX. Rule 2A. C.P.C. is entirely different. The question for determination in the Suit was as to whether the plaintiff Ram Babu Jain was entitled to a decree for injunction in his favour on the ground that he was a tenant of ground floor of house No. 35, while the question for determination in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 was whether the defendants had committed disobedience of an injunction order granted under Order XXXIX, Rule (1) or (2). C.P.C. or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order was made. The controversy raised in the two proceedings though with regard to the same property was not identical. According to the plaintiff, the ex parte injunction order dated 4.11.1985 was to remain in operation till 19.12.1985 as the same had been extended upto the said date by the order dated 3.12.1985 but the defendants broke a portion of the roof and the drainage pipe on 14.12.1985. It may be noticed that the defendants are themselves the owners of the property and were residing on the first floor. The question to be considered in this case was whether the defendants had knowledge of the ex parts injunction order and whether they deliberately committed disobedience of the injunction order. The plaintiff did not lead any evidence in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987. The judgment of the lower appellate court shows that some application was moved wherein a prayer was made that all the three Misc. cases should be heard along with the main suit and this application was allowed on 5.1.1988. In my opinion, the mere fact that an order was passed to hear the Misc. cases along with the main suit would not mean that the Misc. Cases should be decided on the basis of the evidence which had been recorded in the main Suit and by the same order. A proceeding under Order XXXIX. Rule 2A, C.P.C., initiated on the ground of disobedience or breach of injunction order, is in the nature of a criminal proceeding as the person against whom such proceeding is initiated is liable to be detained in prison if it is found that he had committed breach of injunction order. Since a punishment is imposed and a person is sent to Jail, the principle on which these proceedings are decided are entirely different. Here the principle of criminal law will apply and the plaintiff will have to establish beyond any shadow of doubt that the defendants had committed disobedience or breach of the injunction order even though he had full knowledge of the same. The burden of proving its case in such cases lies entirely on the plaintiff. The principle on which a civil suit is decided are different as here decision on the issues arising out of pleadings is taken on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Therefore, a common judgment and order deciding the main suit as well as application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P.C. will not be proper. In my opinion, the order passed by learned Munsif on 11.12.1989 holding the defendants guilty in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and directing them to be detained in civil prison is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
5. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 11.12.1989 of the learned Munsif passed in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and also the Order dated 22.1.1990 of XIIIth Additional District Judge in Misc. Appeal No. 253 of 1989 are quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Agreement to sell - Specific performance - Cuttings and interpolations

IMPORTANT DECISIONS(19.09.2017)

Agreement to sell - Specific performance - Cuttings and interpolations - Initialed by vendor - Cuttings and interpolations thus does not make the agreement doubtful. 2014(4) Civil Court Cases 499 (P&H) 

Civil & Criminal liability - Merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. (2010(1) Criminal Court Cases 779 (S.C.)  

Criminal and civil proceedings - Serious allegations, if, involve factum of recovery of money, it cannot be concluded that complaint is purely civil in nature when other serious allegations prima facie attract the penal provisions - Order quashing criminal proceedings set aside. (2015(1) Criminal Court Cases 637 (S.C.)

Delay of 12 hours in sending FIR to Illaqa Magistrate - Delay not explained - Possibility of ante-timing the same cannot be ruled out. (2010(1) Criminal Court Cases 873 (P&H) (DB)  

Dishonour of cheque - Notice - It is not the requirement of law that date of service of statutory notice is to be disclosed in complaint at the stage of summoning. (2016(1) Criminal Court Cases 851 (All.)  

Domestic violence - Committed before commencement of Act which continued even after passing of the Act - Wife is entitled for protection orders and residence orders u/ss 18 & 19 of the Act along with maintenance allowance. (2014(1) Criminal Court Cases 160 (S.C.) 

Economic offences - Serious charges of forgery - Settlement with bank - Proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the ground that accused has settled the amount with bank. (2016(1) Criminal Court Cases 154 (S.C.) 

Eye witnesses - Statement of eye witnesses recorded after three days of occurrence - No explanation - Eye witnesses not wholly reliable witnesses in view of their unexplained silence and delayed statement to police. (2016(2) Apex Court Judgments 347 (S.C.) 

Food adulteration - Right u/s 13(2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act exercised by one accused - CFL found sample deteriorated and not in a condition fit for analysis - Benefit of CFL report enures to the benefit of all accused - Proceedings quashed. (2016(2) Apex Court Judgments 215 (S.C.) 

Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. - Decree dissolving marriage on ground of adultery - Not entitled to maintenance. (2016(1) Criminal Court Cases 094 (Madras) 

Whether plaintiff is entitled to get enhancement of share if there is death of one co-sharer of property?

Whether plaintiff is entitled to get enhancement of share if there is death of one co-sharer of property?

The   trial   Court   took   into   consideration   the
enhancement in the share of the plaintiff from 1/15th  to 4/15th
because of the death of defendant No. 3 – Smt. Kamal, oneof the cosharers in the suit properties.   The appellate Court
has rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant
No.3Smt.   Kamal   was   insane   on   the   ground   of   lack   of
pleadings and evidence on record. Smt. Kamal was residing
with   defendant   No.   7Avinash,   who   claims   the   share   of
Smt.Kamal in the suit property on the basis of Will dated
02.11.1997 at Exh. 117, though the Will was registered.  With
the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsels   appearing   for   the
parties,  I have gone through the evidence of defendant no.7
and the attesting witness over the Will i.e. DW2 Omprakash
Chandulal Soni and I find that the findings recorded by the
lower appellate Court accepting the said Will are based upon
the evidence available on record.  The Will has been proved
and there is no perversity in recording such finding.   As a
result, the plaintiff would not be entitled to enhancement of
share from 1/5th to 4/15th   as was granted by the trial Court.
Hence, the decree passed by the trial Court will have to be
modified to that extent.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO. 567 OF 2004
Pandurang Sitaram Pande,
V
Avinash Ramkrishna Pande,

CORAM: R. K. DESHPANDE, J.
Dated:   04.08.2016
Citation:2016(6) ALLMR 273

1] One Sitaram @ Balabhau Pande was the owner
and in possession of the suit property.  He died in the year
1978 and was survived by 5 sons, namely, (1) Ramkrushna,
(2) Pandurang, (3) Haribhau, (4) Laxman and (5) Bharat and
two   daughters,   namely,   (1)   Smt.   Jankibai   and   (2)   Smt.
Tarabai.   Smt. Dwarkabai, wife of Sitaram, died in the year
1943 and was thus a predeceased.    The son, Pandurang
Sitaram Pande, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 81 of 2001 on
08.11.2001 for partition and separate possession of his 1/5th
share in the suit properties.   He also claimed a decree of
Rs.30,950/ with future interest at the rate of 18% per annum
by way of mesne profit and also claimed an enquiry into the
mesne profit under Order XX, Rule 12 of Civil Procedure
Code.     The suit was filed on the basis of cause of action
shown   in   the   plaint   as   06.10.2001   when   the   plaintiff   by
issuing notice to the defendant no.7 called upon him to effect
partition of the suit property.  
2] The brothers Haribhau and Laxman were joined
as defendant Nos. 1 and 2.   The third brother Bharat died
before filing of suit and therefore, his widow Smt.Kamal was
joined as defendant No. 3.  Two sisters namely Smt.Jankibai
and Smt.Tarabai died in the year 1985 and 1987 respectively
i.e. before filing of the suit, but their legal heirs were not
joined   as   party   defendants   in   the   suit.   Since   the   brother
Ramkrushna died in the year 1990, his two surviving sons,
namely Avinash and Pramod were joined as defendant Nos.
7 and 8 respectively,   whereas the widow and daughter of
one Subhash (dead), the another son of Ramkrushna, were
joined as defendant Nos. 5 and 6 respectively.   Smt. Kamal
died on 11.02.2002 i.e. during the pendency of the suit and
the   defendant   No.7Avinash,  the   son   of  Ramkrushna,  the
eldest   brother   of   the   plaintiff,   claimed   himself   to   be   the
legatee in respect the  share devolved upon Smt.Kamal, on
the   basis   of   will   executed   by   her   on   02.11.1997.   The
defendants opposed the claim of the plaintiff.
3] The trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 81 of
2001, decided on 31.10.2002 recorded the finding that the
suit properties were the joint family properties and the plaintiff
had established his claim of 4/15th share in the suit property
against his claim for 1/5th   share. The trial Court rejected the
claim of defendant No. 7Avinash for addition of 1/5th   share
on the basis of Will dated 02.11.1997, said to have been
executed by Smt. Kamal, the defendant No. 3. The trial Court
also rejected the contention of the defendants that the suit
was liable to be dismissed as barred by law of limitation and
for non joinder of necessary parties, namely the legal heirs of
two daughters – Smt.Jankibai and Smt.Tarabai, by accepting
the   contention   of   the   plaintiff   that   both   the   sisters   had
executed relinquishment deed dated 06.01.1981 in favour of
all the brothers in respect of their shares in the properties.
4] Regular Civil Appeal No. 294 of 2002 preferred
by the original defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 4 was allowed by the
appellate Court on 30.08.2004 and the decree for partition
and separate possession passed by the trial Court was set
aside and the suit was dismissed.  The lower appellate Court
records the finding that Will executed by respondent No.3
Kamal in favour of defendant No.7Avinash has been proved;
the suit is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of legal heirs
of deceased Smt. Jankibai and Smt.Tarabai in the suit; the
suit was barred by the law of limitation and the trial Court had
no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.  Hence,  as the
original plaintiff is died and his legal heirs along with original
defendant no.2 through his legal heirs are before this Court in
this second appeal.
5] The appeal was admitted on 16.12.2008 and this
Court framed the substantial question of law as under;
"Whether the suit (wrongly typed as appeal) of the
plaintiff/   appellant   could   have   been   dismissed   for
want of legal heirs of two sisters on record?"
6] The appellants filed Civil Application No. 5737 of
2008 in the second appeal for grant of permission to join the
legal representatives of two sisters namely Smt.Jankibai and
Smt. Tarabai on the record of the plaint as defendants and in
this appeal as respondents.  This Court passed an order on
the said application on 10.01.2013, as under;
"The notices of this Civil Application were issued.  The
persons whose names are stated in the application are
served.   Shri Thakkar, the learned counsel has filed
power for the proposed respondent Nos. 8 to 13.
The names of respondent Nos. 8 to 13 are, therefore,
permitted to be brought on record.
Necessary amendment to be carried out within a period
of 2 weeks .
The stand taken by the added respondents in their reply
shall be considered by the Court at the time of hearing.
Hence, the reply filed by the added respondents shall
be taken on record.
C.A. No. 5737/08 stands disposed of".
7] Heard   Shri   C.A.   Joshi,   the   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants   and   Shri   Anil   Mardikar,   the
learned   senior   counsel   assisted   by   Shri   Amit   Joshi,
Advocate,   for   defendant   Nos.   7   and   8,   who   are   the
respondent   nos.   1   and   2   in   this   appeal   (the   sons   of
Ramkrushna, the eldest brother of the plaintiff)
8] Shri   Joshi   appearing   for   the   appellants   has
urged that the relinquishment of claim of the share by two
sisters – Smt. Jankibai and Smt. Taraibai on 06.01.1981 has
been established and therefore, it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to have joined the sisters as party defendants in the
suit.  He submits that even if it is accepted that two sisters
were necessary parties to the suit in question,   the defect
was   curable   and   this   Court   having   allowed   the   Civil
Application No. 5757/08 on 10.01.2013, it stands removed
and the L.Rs of two sisters have filed their reply in this Court
stating in clear terms that they do not want to claim any share
in the suit properties.  He further submits that the Will dated
02.11.1997   at   Exh.   117   said   to   have   been   executed   by
Smt.Kamal, the defendant no.3, has not been proved and
hence, the share of the plaintiff in the suit property shall
increase from 1/5th   to 4/15th, which was rightly decreed by
the trial Court.  Shri Joshi, therefore, submits that the decree
passed by the trial Court be restored by setting aside the
decision of the lower appellate Court.
9] Per contra, Shri Mardikar, for respondent Nos. 1
and 2, has urged that non joinder of two sisters in a suit for
partition and separate possession becomes fatal for grant of
reliefs claimed in the suit and to permit the plaintiffs to join
the   necessary   parties   to   the   suit   at   the   stage   of   second
appeal would create a bar of limitation  as the cause of action
for filing the suit as shown in the plaint was of 06.10.2001
and   the   application   for   joining   the   necessary   parties   was
moved before this Court  on 03.08.2008, which was allowed
on 10.01.2013.   He submits that the limitation is governed by
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period
of 3 years from the date of cause of action.  He relied upon
the   decision   of   the   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of
Kanakarathanammal     vrs.     V.S.Loganatha   Mudaliar   and
another, reported in AIR 1965 SC 271.    Shri Mardikar also
relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Union of India  vrs. Ibrahim Uddin and another,  reported in
(2012) 8 SCC 148  for the proposition that the plaintiff having
failed to produce the document of relinquishment deed dated
06.01.1981, adverse inference was required to be drawn  and
for it, the adverse inference cannot be drawn against the
defendant no.7 on the ground that he was in possession of
the relinquishment deed and has failed to produced it.
10] The   lower   appellate   Court   has   recorded   the
finding   that   the   suit   properties   were   not   the   ancestral
properties of Sitaram Jayram Pande, the father of the plaintiff
and defendants,  but were gifted to him by his fatherinlaw.
Sitaram Pande died intestate and, therefore, the properties
devolved upon the heirs of Sitaram Pande in accordance with
the   general   rules   of   succession   in   the   case   of   mens,   as
specified under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, by
5 sons and 2 daughters – they being the ClassI heirs.
11] Normally, each of the heirs would be entitled to
1/7th share in the suit properties.  The plaintiff in the suit in
question, however, claimed 1/5th   share in the suit properties
by taking into consideration the fact that Smt. Jankibai and
Smt. Tarabai, two daughters of Sitaram,   have relinquished
their shares in the suit properties.  The relinquishment deed
dated   06.01.1981   executed  by   two  sisters   of  the   plaintiff,
namely     Smt.   Jankibai   and   Smt.   Tarabai,   has   not   been
placed on record.   I need not dwell upon this aspect any
more except to hold that two sisters were necessary parties
to the suit in question and they cannot be called as 'proper
parties'.   Let us now see whether non joinder of necessary
parties, in the facts and circumstances of this case, becomes
fatal.
12] No doubt, that the issue regarding non joinder of
necessary parties was raised in the trial Court and it was also
framed.   The trial Court records the finding that since two
sisters have relinquished  their  share,   the suit  cannot  be
dismissed for non joinder of necessary parties.   The lower
appellate Court for the first time dismisses the suit on the
ground of non joinder of necessary parties. As pointed out
earlier,     the   appellant/plaintiff,   realizing   the   mistake,   filed
Civil Application No. 5737 of 2008 in this second appeal for
grant of permission to join the legal representatives of two
sisters,   was   not   opposed   and   allowed   by   this   Court   on
10.01.2013. Accordingly, their names are brought on record
and also in the present second appeal.
13] Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
being relevant, is reproduced below;
"O.I   R   10(2)  –   The   Court   may   at   any   stage   of   the
proceedings,   either   upon   or   without   the   application   of
either party, and on such terms as may be appear to the
Court   to   be   just   order   that   the   name   of   any   party
improperly   joined,   whether  as   plaintiff   or  defendant   be
struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to
have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or
whose presence before the Court may be necessary in
order to enable the Court effectually and completely to
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in
the suit, be added."
The aforesaid provision confers a discretion upon the Court
to permit the name of any person who ought to have been
joined,  whether as plaintiff or defendant,  or whose presence
before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the
Court to effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added at any
stage of proceedings.  The second appeal being continuation
of the suit,   this Court is competent to exercise discretion
even at the second appellate stage to permit the joinder of
necessary   parties   to   the   suit.     Once   such   permission   is
granted   and   the   parties   are   joined   as   defendants/
respondents in the proceedings,   the order relates back to
the date of filing of the suit and the defect stands cured.
14] All   the   parties   added,   who   are   the   legal
representatives of the two sisters of the plaintiff namely  Smt.
Jankibai and Smt. Tarabai, have filed their reply on oath to
the application of the plaintiff for grant of permission to join
them as party defendants/respondents in the proceedings.  In
categorical terms they have stated in their reply that they do
not want to claim any share or interest in the suit properties
and their predecessor in title had relinquished their shares in
favour of the brothers.  There is no contest involved which is
required   to   be   adjudicated   by   this   Court   upon   granting
permission to join certain persons as defendants/respondents
in the proceedings.  The plaintiff would, therefore, be entitled
to   1/5th    share   in   the   suit   property   and   the   suit   cannot,
therefore, be dismissed in the facts and circumstances of this
case   for   non   joinder   of   necessary   parties.   The   lower
appellate Court ought to have granted an opportunity to the
plaintiff to add the necessary parties to the proceedings and
it is only upon the failure of the plaintiff to comply with such
direction as contemplated by Order 1, Rule 13 of C.P.C., the
suit   could   not   have   been   dismissed   on   the   ground   of
nonjoinder of necessary parties.  The substantial question of
law is, therefore, answered accordingly.
15] Shri Anil Mardikar appearing for defendant No.7
has relied upon decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR
1965 SC 271 (cited supra) to urge that the Apex Court had
refused to grant permission to add necessary parties to the
suit in the appeal  pending before the Apex Court on the
ground that the appellant therein was not vigilant and that the
bar of limitation would also operate for permitting the joinder
of necessary parties in the appeal pending before the Apex
Court.  In my opinion, the decision is clearly distinguishable.
It was a suit filed for recovery of possession by the appellant
claiming exclusive title over the entire suit property.   It was
not a suit for partition and separate possession.  The Apex
Court found that such claim was not tenable and the other
brothers were also entitled to succeed to the estate.  In the
present case, the plaintiff claims only 1/5th   share in the suit
properties and other cosharers likely to oppose the claim
are joined as parties to the suit.   The Apex Court has also
held that the trial Court itself dismissed the suit on the ground
of nonjoinder of necessary parties,   the appellant did not
take any steps to join the necessary parties either in the
appeal before the High Court or even in the appeal before
the Apex Court till the hearing was concluded. In the present
case, immediately after the decision of lower appellate Court,
the plaintiff  moved application which has been allowed. The
Apex Court considered the bar of limitation in a situation
which is not available in the present case.
16] So   far   as   applicability   of   law   of   limitation   is
concerned,  Articles 58, 65, 110 and 113 of the Limitation Act
were brought to my notice.   In some decisions of this Court,
it was held that Article 65 would apply, whereas in some
decisions, it was held that Article 113 would apply. Article 58
deals with the suits filed to obtain any declaration and for that
3 years limitation is prescribed from the date when the right
to sue first accrues.  Article 113 deals with the suit for which
no   period   of   limitation   is   prescribed   elsewhere   in   the
schedule and the period of limitation is of 3 years which
begins from the date when the right to sue accrues.  Article
65 deals with the possession of immovable property or any
interest therein based on title and it prescribes the period of
limitation of 12 years from the date  when the possession of
the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.  Article 110
deals with the suit by a person excluded from a joint family
property to enforce a right of share therein and the period of
limitation prescribed is of 12 years from the date when the
section becomes known to the plaintiff.
17] In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Md. Mohammad Ali vrs. Jagdish Kalita and others,  reported
in  (2004) 1 SCC 271,   the Court was concerned with the
applicability of Article 65 of the Limitation Act and it was held
that the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title over the suit
property and it would be for the defendant to plead and prove
the plea of adverse possession to defeat the claim of the
plaintiff. This decision has been followed by the Apex Court in
the case of Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh and ors  vrs.
Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh,  reported in  (2004) 13 SCC 385,
wherein it is held that unless the defendant raises defence of
adverse possession to  claim for a  share by a heir to be
ancestral property,  he cannot also raise an issue relating to
limitation of the plaintiff's claim.   The Court held that in the
absence of such plea of adverse possession being raised in
the written statement, the plea of limitation was not available.
Both these decisions are applicable to the facts of this case
and in the absence of any plea of adverse possession by any
of the parties, the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by
limitation.
18] Article 110 of the Limitation Act relied upon by
Shri Mardikar deals with the suit by a person excluded from a
joint family property to enforce a right to share therein. In the
present case,  the shares are devolved upon the parties to
the   suit   in   accordance   with   Section   8   of   the   Hindu
Succession Act and it is not a suit where the partition has
already taken place and the plaintiff is excluded from the joint
family   property.     It   is   also   not   a   suit   for   enforcement   of
partition   and   separate   possession,   as   contemplated   by
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, though it is styled as
such. The decision has no application to the facts of this
case.
19] The   trial   Court   took   into   consideration   the
enhancement in the share of the plaintiff from 1/15th  to 4/15th
because of the death of defendant No. 3 – Smt. Kamal, one
of the cosharers in the suit properties.   The appellate Court
has rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant
No.3Smt.   Kamal   was   insane   on   the   ground   of   lack   of
pleadings and evidence on record. Smt. Kamal was residing
with   defendant   No.   7Avinash,   who   claims   the   share   of
Smt.Kamal in the suit property on the basis of Will dated
02.11.1997 at Exh. 117, though the Will was registered.  With
the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsels   appearing   for   the
parties,  I have gone through the evidence of defendant no.7
and the attesting witness over the Will i.e. DW2 Omprakash
Chandulal Soni and I find that the findings recorded by the
lower appellate Court accepting the said Will are based upon
the evidence available on record.  The Will has been proved
and there is no perversity in recording such finding.   As a
result, the plaintiff would not be entitled to enhancement of
share from 1/5th to 4/15th   as was granted by the trial Court.
Hence, the decree passed by the trial Court will have to be
modified to that extent.
20] The Second Appeal is, therefore, partly allowed.
The judgment and order dated 30.08.2004 passed in Regular
Civil   Appeal   No.294   of   2002   is   hereby   quashed   and   set
aside. The decree passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil
Suit No. 81 of 2002 on 31.10.2002 is modified as under;
I] The plaintiff is entitled to partition and separate
possession of 1/5th share in the suit property i.e.
(1) field Gat No. 1277, 6H 52R, (2) field Gat No.
1257,   4H   27R   at   village   Shirpur,   (3)   House
bearing Gram Panchayat No. 895, admeasuring
100 x 100 sq.feet and (4) space "Chakki  Chi
Jaga" with flour mill.
II] The defendant No.1 is entitled to 1/5th share, the
defendant No. 2 is entitled to 1/5th  share,   the
defendant no. 4 is entitled to 1/20th   share, the
defendant   nos.  5  and  6  are   jointly  entitled  to
1/20th   share, the defendant No. 7 is entitled to
1/4th share and the defendant no.8 is entitled to
1/20th  share   from   the   whole   suit   property
described above.
III] The plaintiff is entitled to an enquiry into mense
profit against the defendant No.7 as per Order
20, Rule 12 of C.P.C from the date of suit i.e.
08.11.2001   until   the   actual   partition   and
possession of the suit property.
IV] The defendant Nos. 4, 7 and 8 do bear their own
cost and proportionate cost of the plaintiff.
V] Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 do bear their own
cost.
VII] A precept be sent to the Collector, Washim to
effect partition and separate possession of the
suit   field   Gat   Nos.   1277,   6H   52R   and   1257,
4H 27R situated at village Shirpur for 1/5th share
to the plaintiff only.Whether plaintiff is entitled to get enhancement of share if there is death of one co-sharer of property?

The   trial   Court   took   into   consideration   the
enhancement in the share of the plaintiff from 1/15th  to 4/15th
because of the death of defendant No. 3 – Smt. Kamal, oneof the cosharers in the suit properties.   The appellate Court
has rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant
No.3Smt.   Kamal   was   insane   on   the   ground   of   lack   of
pleadings and evidence on record. Smt. Kamal was residing
with   defendant   No.   7Avinash,   who   claims   the   share   of
Smt.Kamal in the suit property on the basis of Will dated
02.11.1997 at Exh. 117, though the Will was registered.  With
the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsels   appearing   for   the
parties,  I have gone through the evidence of defendant no.7
and the attesting witness over the Will i.e. DW2 Omprakash
Chandulal Soni and I find that the findings recorded by the
lower appellate Court accepting the said Will are based upon
the evidence available on record.  The Will has been proved
and there is no perversity in recording such finding.   As a
result, the plaintiff would not be entitled to enhancement of
share from 1/5th to 4/15th   as was granted by the trial Court.
Hence, the decree passed by the trial Court will have to be
modified to that extent.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO. 567 OF 2004
Pandurang Sitaram Pande,
V
Avinash Ramkrishna Pande,

CORAM: R. K. DESHPANDE, J.
Dated:   04.08.2016
Citation:2016(6) ALLMR 273

1] One Sitaram @ Balabhau Pande was the owner
and in possession of the suit property.  He died in the year
1978 and was survived by 5 sons, namely, (1) Ramkrushna,
(2) Pandurang, (3) Haribhau, (4) Laxman and (5) Bharat and
two   daughters,   namely,   (1)   Smt.   Jankibai   and   (2)   Smt.
Tarabai.   Smt. Dwarkabai, wife of Sitaram, died in the year
1943 and was thus a predeceased.    The son, Pandurang
Sitaram Pande, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 81 of 2001 on
08.11.2001 for partition and separate possession of his 1/5th
share in the suit properties.   He also claimed a decree of
Rs.30,950/ with future interest at the rate of 18% per annum
by way of mesne profit and also claimed an enquiry into the
mesne profit under Order XX, Rule 12 of Civil Procedure
Code.     The suit was filed on the basis of cause of action
shown   in   the   plaint   as   06.10.2001   when   the   plaintiff   by
issuing notice to the defendant no.7 called upon him to effect
partition of the suit property.  
2] The brothers Haribhau and Laxman were joined
as defendant Nos. 1 and 2.   The third brother Bharat died
before filing of suit and therefore, his widow Smt.Kamal was
joined as defendant No. 3.  Two sisters namely Smt.Jankibai
and Smt.Tarabai died in the year 1985 and 1987 respectively
i.e. before filing of the suit, but their legal heirs were not
joined   as   party   defendants   in   the   suit.   Since   the   brother
Ramkrushna died in the year 1990, his two surviving sons,
namely Avinash and Pramod were joined as defendant Nos.
7 and 8 respectively,   whereas the widow and daughter of
one Subhash (dead), the another son of Ramkrushna, were
joined as defendant Nos. 5 and 6 respectively.   Smt. Kamal
died on 11.02.2002 i.e. during the pendency of the suit and
the   defendant   No.7Avinash,  the   son   of  Ramkrushna,  the
eldest   brother   of   the   plaintiff,   claimed   himself   to   be   the
legatee in respect the  share devolved upon Smt.Kamal, on
the   basis   of   will   executed   by   her   on   02.11.1997.   The
defendants opposed the claim of the plaintiff.
3] The trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 81 of
2001, decided on 31.10.2002 recorded the finding that the
suit properties were the joint family properties and the plaintiff
had established his claim of 4/15th share in the suit property
against his claim for 1/5th   share. The trial Court rejected the
claim of defendant No. 7Avinash for addition of 1/5th   share
on the basis of Will dated 02.11.1997, said to have been
executed by Smt. Kamal, the defendant No. 3. The trial Court
also rejected the contention of the defendants that the suit
was liable to be dismissed as barred by law of limitation and
for non joinder of necessary parties, namely the legal heirs of
two daughters – Smt.Jankibai and Smt.Tarabai, by accepting
the   contention   of   the   plaintiff   that   both   the   sisters   had
executed relinquishment deed dated 06.01.1981 in favour of
all the brothers in respect of their shares in the properties.
4] Regular Civil Appeal No. 294 of 2002 preferred
by the original defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 4 was allowed by the
appellate Court on 30.08.2004 and the decree for partition
and separate possession passed by the trial Court was set
aside and the suit was dismissed.  The lower appellate Court
records the finding that Will executed by respondent No.3
Kamal in favour of defendant No.7Avinash has been proved;
the suit is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of legal heirs
of deceased Smt. Jankibai and Smt.Tarabai in the suit; the
suit was barred by the law of limitation and the trial Court had
no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.  Hence,  as the
original plaintiff is died and his legal heirs along with original
defendant no.2 through his legal heirs are before this Court in
this second appeal.
5] The appeal was admitted on 16.12.2008 and this
Court framed the substantial question of law as under;
"Whether the suit (wrongly typed as appeal) of the
plaintiff/   appellant   could   have   been   dismissed   for
want of legal heirs of two sisters on record?"
6] The appellants filed Civil Application No. 5737 of
2008 in the second appeal for grant of permission to join the
legal representatives of two sisters namely Smt.Jankibai and
Smt. Tarabai on the record of the plaint as defendants and in
this appeal as respondents.  This Court passed an order on
the said application on 10.01.2013, as under;
"The notices of this Civil Application were issued.  The
persons whose names are stated in the application are
served.   Shri Thakkar, the learned counsel has filed
power for the proposed respondent Nos. 8 to 13.
The names of respondent Nos. 8 to 13 are, therefore,
permitted to be brought on record.
Necessary amendment to be carried out within a period
of 2 weeks .
The stand taken by the added respondents in their reply
shall be considered by the Court at the time of hearing.
Hence, the reply filed by the added respondents shall
be taken on record.
C.A. No. 5737/08 stands disposed of".
7] Heard   Shri   C.A.   Joshi,   the   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants   and   Shri   Anil   Mardikar,   the
learned   senior   counsel   assisted   by   Shri   Amit   Joshi,
Advocate,   for   defendant   Nos.   7   and   8,   who   are   the
respondent   nos.   1   and   2   in   this   appeal   (the   sons   of
Ramkrushna, the eldest brother of the plaintiff)
8] Shri   Joshi   appearing   for   the   appellants   has
urged that the relinquishment of claim of the share by two
sisters – Smt. Jankibai and Smt. Taraibai on 06.01.1981 has
been established and therefore, it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to have joined the sisters as party defendants in the
suit.  He submits that even if it is accepted that two sisters
were necessary parties to the suit in question,   the defect
was   curable   and   this   Court   having   allowed   the   Civil
Application No. 5757/08 on 10.01.2013, it stands removed
and the L.Rs of two sisters have filed their reply in this Court
stating in clear terms that they do not want to claim any share
in the suit properties.  He further submits that the Will dated
02.11.1997   at   Exh.   117   said   to   have   been   executed   by
Smt.Kamal, the defendant no.3, has not been proved and
hence, the share of the plaintiff in the suit property shall
increase from 1/5th   to 4/15th, which was rightly decreed by
the trial Court.  Shri Joshi, therefore, submits that the decree
passed by the trial Court be restored by setting aside the
decision of the lower appellate Court.
9] Per contra, Shri Mardikar, for respondent Nos. 1
and 2, has urged that non joinder of two sisters in a suit for
partition and separate possession becomes fatal for grant of
reliefs claimed in the suit and to permit the plaintiffs to join
the   necessary   parties   to   the   suit   at   the   stage   of   second
appeal would create a bar of limitation  as the cause of action
for filing the suit as shown in the plaint was of 06.10.2001
and   the   application   for   joining   the   necessary   parties   was
moved before this Court  on 03.08.2008, which was allowed
on 10.01.2013.   He submits that the limitation is governed by
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period
of 3 years from the date of cause of action.  He relied upon
the   decision   of   the   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of
Kanakarathanammal     vrs.     V.S.Loganatha   Mudaliar   and
another, reported in AIR 1965 SC 271.    Shri Mardikar also
relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Union of India  vrs. Ibrahim Uddin and another,  reported in
(2012) 8 SCC 148  for the proposition that the plaintiff having
failed to produce the document of relinquishment deed dated
06.01.1981, adverse inference was required to be drawn  and
for it, the adverse inference cannot be drawn against the
defendant no.7 on the ground that he was in possession of
the relinquishment deed and has failed to produced it.
10] The   lower   appellate   Court   has   recorded   the
finding   that   the   suit   properties   were   not   the   ancestral
properties of Sitaram Jayram Pande, the father of the plaintiff
and defendants,  but were gifted to him by his fatherinlaw.
Sitaram Pande died intestate and, therefore, the properties
devolved upon the heirs of Sitaram Pande in accordance with
the   general   rules   of   succession   in   the   case   of   mens,   as
specified under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, by
5 sons and 2 daughters – they being the ClassI heirs.
11] Normally, each of the heirs would be entitled to
1/7th share in the suit properties.  The plaintiff in the suit in
question, however, claimed 1/5th   share in the suit properties
by taking into consideration the fact that Smt. Jankibai and
Smt. Tarabai, two daughters of Sitaram,   have relinquished
their shares in the suit properties.  The relinquishment deed
dated   06.01.1981   executed  by   two  sisters   of  the   plaintiff,
namely     Smt.   Jankibai   and   Smt.   Tarabai,   has   not   been
placed on record.   I need not dwell upon this aspect any
more except to hold that two sisters were necessary parties
to the suit in question and they cannot be called as 'proper
parties'.   Let us now see whether non joinder of necessary
parties, in the facts and circumstances of this case, becomes
fatal.
12] No doubt, that the issue regarding non joinder of
necessary parties was raised in the trial Court and it was also
framed.   The trial Court records the finding that since two
sisters have relinquished  their  share,   the suit  cannot  be
dismissed for non joinder of necessary parties.   The lower
appellate Court for the first time dismisses the suit on the
ground of non joinder of necessary parties. As pointed out
earlier,     the   appellant/plaintiff,   realizing   the   mistake,   filed
Civil Application No. 5737 of 2008 in this second appeal for
grant of permission to join the legal representatives of two
sisters,   was   not   opposed   and   allowed   by   this   Court   on
10.01.2013. Accordingly, their names are brought on record
and also in the present second appeal.
13] Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
being relevant, is reproduced below;
"O.I   R   10(2)  –   The   Court   may   at   any   stage   of   the
proceedings,   either   upon   or   without   the   application   of
either party, and on such terms as may be appear to the
Court   to   be   just   order   that   the   name   of   any   party
improperly   joined,   whether  as   plaintiff   or  defendant   be
struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to
have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or
whose presence before the Court may be necessary in
order to enable the Court effectually and completely to
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in
the suit, be added."
The aforesaid provision confers a discretion upon the Court
to permit the name of any person who ought to have been
joined,  whether as plaintiff or defendant,  or whose presence
before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the
Court to effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added at any
stage of proceedings.  The second appeal being continuation
of the suit,   this Court is competent to exercise discretion
even at the second appellate stage to permit the joinder of
necessary   parties   to   the   suit.     Once   such   permission   is
granted   and   the   parties   are   joined   as   defendants/
respondents in the proceedings,   the order relates back to
the date of filing of the suit and the defect stands cured.
14] All   the   parties   added,   who   are   the   legal
representatives of the two sisters of the plaintiff namely  Smt.
Jankibai and Smt. Tarabai, have filed their reply on oath to
the application of the plaintiff for grant of permission to join
them as party defendants/respondents in the proceedings.  In
categorical terms they have stated in their reply that they do
not want to claim any share or interest in the suit properties
and their predecessor in title had relinquished their shares in
favour of the brothers.  There is no contest involved which is
required   to   be   adjudicated   by   this   Court   upon   granting
permission to join certain persons as defendants/respondents
in the proceedings.  The plaintiff would, therefore, be entitled
to   1/5th    share   in   the   suit   property   and   the   suit   cannot,
therefore, be dismissed in the facts and circumstances of this
case   for   non   joinder   of   necessary   parties.   The   lower
appellate Court ought to have granted an opportunity to the
plaintiff to add the necessary parties to the proceedings and
it is only upon the failure of the plaintiff to comply with such
direction as contemplated by Order 1, Rule 13 of C.P.C., the
suit   could   not   have   been   dismissed   on   the   ground   of
nonjoinder of necessary parties.  The substantial question of
law is, therefore, answered accordingly.
15] Shri Anil Mardikar appearing for defendant No.7
has relied upon decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR
1965 SC 271 (cited supra) to urge that the Apex Court had
refused to grant permission to add necessary parties to the
suit in the appeal  pending before the Apex Court on the
ground that the appellant therein was not vigilant and that the
bar of limitation would also operate for permitting the joinder
of necessary parties in the appeal pending before the Apex
Court.  In my opinion, the decision is clearly distinguishable.
It was a suit filed for recovery of possession by the appellant
claiming exclusive title over the entire suit property.   It was
not a suit for partition and separate possession.  The Apex
Court found that such claim was not tenable and the other
brothers were also entitled to succeed to the estate.  In the
present case, the plaintiff claims only 1/5th   share in the suit
properties and other cosharers likely to oppose the claim
are joined as parties to the suit.   The Apex Court has also
held that the trial Court itself dismissed the suit on the ground
of nonjoinder of necessary parties,   the appellant did not
take any steps to join the necessary parties either in the
appeal before the High Court or even in the appeal before
the Apex Court till the hearing was concluded. In the present
case, immediately after the decision of lower appellate Court,
the plaintiff  moved application which has been allowed. The
Apex Court considered the bar of limitation in a situation
which is not available in the present case.
16] So   far   as   applicability   of   law   of   limitation   is
concerned,  Articles 58, 65, 110 and 113 of the Limitation Act
were brought to my notice.   In some decisions of this Court,
it was held that Article 65 would apply, whereas in some
decisions, it was held that Article 113 would apply. Article 58
deals with the suits filed to obtain any declaration and for that
3 years limitation is prescribed from the date when the right
to sue first accrues.  Article 113 deals with the suit for which
no   period   of   limitation   is   prescribed   elsewhere   in   the
schedule and the period of limitation is of 3 years which
begins from the date when the right to sue accrues.  Article
65 deals with the possession of immovable property or any
interest therein based on title and it prescribes the period of
limitation of 12 years from the date  when the possession of
the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.  Article 110
deals with the suit by a person excluded from a joint family
property to enforce a right of share therein and the period of
limitation prescribed is of 12 years from the date when the
section becomes known to the plaintiff.
17] In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Md. Mohammad Ali vrs. Jagdish Kalita and others,  reported
in  (2004) 1 SCC 271,   the Court was concerned with the
applicability of Article 65 of the Limitation Act and it was held
that the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title over the suit
property and it would be for the defendant to plead and prove
the plea of adverse possession to defeat the claim of the
plaintiff. This decision has been followed by the Apex Court in
the case of Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh and ors  vrs.
Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh,  reported in  (2004) 13 SCC 385,
wherein it is held that unless the defendant raises defence of
adverse possession to  claim for a  share by a heir to be
ancestral property,  he cannot also raise an issue relating to
limitation of the plaintiff's claim.   The Court held that in the
absence of such plea of adverse possession being raised in
the written statement, the plea of limitation was not available.
Both these decisions are applicable to the facts of this case
and in the absence of any plea of adverse possession by any
of the parties, the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by
limitation.
18] Article 110 of the Limitation Act relied upon by
Shri Mardikar deals with the suit by a person excluded from a
joint family property to enforce a right to share therein. In the
present case,  the shares are devolved upon the parties to
the   suit   in   accordance   with   Section   8   of   the   Hindu
Succession Act and it is not a suit where the partition has
already taken place and the plaintiff is excluded from the joint
family   property.     It   is   also   not   a   suit   for   enforcement   of
partition   and   separate   possession,   as   contemplated   by
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, though it is styled as
such. The decision has no application to the facts of this
case.
19] The   trial   Court   took   into   consideration   the
enhancement in the share of the plaintiff from 1/15th  to 4/15th
because of the death of defendant No. 3 – Smt. Kamal, one
of the cosharers in the suit properties.   The appellate Court
has rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant
No.3Smt.   Kamal   was   insane   on   the   ground   of   lack   of
pleadings and evidence on record. Smt. Kamal was residing
with   defendant   No.   7Avinash,   who   claims   the   share   of
Smt.Kamal in the suit property on the basis of Will dated
02.11.1997 at Exh. 117, though the Will was registered.  With
the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsels   appearing   for   the
parties,  I have gone through the evidence of defendant no.7
and the attesting witness over the Will i.e. DW2 Omprakash
Chandulal Soni and I find that the findings recorded by the
lower appellate Court accepting the said Will are based upon
the evidence available on record.  The Will has been proved
and there is no perversity in recording such finding.   As a
result, the plaintiff would not be entitled to enhancement of
share from 1/5th to 4/15th   as was granted by the trial Court.
Hence, the decree passed by the trial Court will have to be
modified to that extent.
20] The Second Appeal is, therefore, partly allowed.
The judgment and order dated 30.08.2004 passed in Regular
Civil   Appeal   No.294   of   2002   is   hereby   quashed   and   set
aside. The decree passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil
Suit No. 81 of 2002 on 31.10.2002 is modified as under;
I] The plaintiff is entitled to partition and separate
possession of 1/5th share in the suit property i.e.
(1) field Gat No. 1277, 6H 52R, (2) field Gat No.
1257,   4H   27R   at   village   Shirpur,   (3)   House
bearing Gram Panchayat No. 895, admeasuring
100 x 100 sq.feet and (4) space "Chakki  Chi
Jaga" with flour mill.
II] The defendant No.1 is entitled to 1/5th share, the
defendant No. 2 is entitled to 1/5th  share,   the
defendant no. 4 is entitled to 1/20th   share, the
defendant   nos.  5  and  6  are   jointly  entitled  to
1/20th   share, the defendant No. 7 is entitled to
1/4th share and the defendant no.8 is entitled to
1/20th  share   from   the   whole   suit   property
described above.
III] The plaintiff is entitled to an enquiry into mense
profit against the defendant No.7 as per Order
20, Rule 12 of C.P.C from the date of suit i.e.
08.11.2001   until   the   actual   partition   and
possession of the suit property.
IV] The defendant Nos. 4, 7 and 8 do bear their own
cost and proportionate cost of the plaintiff.
V] Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 do bear their own
cost.
VII] A precept be sent to the Collector, Washim to
effect partition and separate possession of the
suit   field   Gat   Nos.   1277,   6H   52R   and   1257,
4H 27R situated at village Shirpur for 1/5th share
to the plaintiff only.